Maximum Danger
IP address 206.123.145.46 is a critical-risk address that has generated 784 confirmed abuse reports from automated honeypot sensors within approximately two months, with all recent activity classified as hacking and specifically including detected SSH intrusion attempts targeting exposed services.
The address originates from AS60223 operated by Netiface Limited in the United States, and the substantial volume of 784 reports concentrated across a two-month window between March and April 2026 indicates sustained and deliberate hostile activity rather than opportunistic scanning. All 20 most recent reports across 20 distinct honeypot sensors uniformly categorize the activity as hacking, giving the assessment a 79 percent confidence rating. The network operator and geographic location provide context, but the sheer report density and consistent threat categorization are the primary risk indicators for this IP.
The detected SSH session in progress on an expected port represents a concrete manifestation of the hacking category — automated honeypot sensors identified an active connection attempt indicative of credential brute-forcing, vulnerability probing, or session hijacking preparation against exposed SSH daemons. SSH services remain one of the most frequently targeted attack surfaces on internet-facing servers because they provide direct administrative access if compromised. The presence of a detected active session means an attacker has progressed beyond initial reconnaissance into the execution phase of an intrusion, posing an immediate threat to any exposed service accepting connections from this address.
Site operators should immediately block IP address 206.123.145.46 at the firewall level and implement fail2ban or equivalent tools to automate dynamic blocking based on authentication failures. Enforcing key-based SSH authentication exclusively while disabling password-based authentication eliminates the primary attack vector exploited in these scenarios. Rate-limiting incoming SSH connections and enforcing strict access-control lists that permit SSH only from trusted IP ranges further reduces exposure. Regular security patching of SSH daemons and continuous log monitoring for unusual authentication patterns remain essential baseline practices against this class of threat.
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