High Risk
IP 92.63.197.79 is a high-risk address operating from Ukrainian network infrastructure that automated honeypot sensors have flagged for sustained and aggressive port-scanning behaviour, with 1269 total incident reports filed against this single source since March 2026.
Community abuse reports and honeypot telemetry reveal that IP 92.63.197.79, registered to FOP Dmytro Nedilskyi under ASN AS211736, has maintained an activity frequency score of 8 out of 10 over a three-month observation window ending in June 2026. The address generated 20 port-scan reports specifically documenting Cisco ASA reconnaissance probes targeting exposed network interfaces. The 91% confidence score and high report volume indicate this is not an isolated or accidental pattern but rather persistent, methodical scanning activity originating from a single autonomous system.
Port scanning constitutes the initial reconnaissance phase of most targeted attacks, allowing threat actors to map open services, identify vulnerable versions of software, and catalogue potential entry points before launching exploitation attempts. The Cisco ASA probe pattern detected against this IP specifically targets firewall and security appliance configurations, suggesting the scanning operation is oriented toward compromising perimeter network defences rather than generically surveying any available host. An address with this level of report density and confirmed scanning intent represents a concrete pre-attack threat to any exposed services.
Site operators should treat IP 92.63.197.79 as hostile and implement immediate blocking rules at the network perimeter firewall. Organisations running Cisco ASA appliances should verify that management interfaces are not exposed to the internet and should enforce strict access-control lists. Deploying fail2ban or equivalent dynamic firewall tools can automate the process of detecting and temporarily banning scanning patterns. Regular audit of exposed services and implementation of port-knocking or connection-rate limiting further reduces the attack surface that reconnaissance activity like this attempts to exploit.
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