Significant Threat
IP address 81.30.212.94, registered in Russia and operated by JSC Ufanet on ASN AS24955, presents a high-risk threat profile with a threat level of 8/10 and a confidence score of 89%. This address has accumulated 199 total abuse reports, with its dominant threat category being SSH brute-force attacks, and its activity frequency rated at 5/10 over a reporting window spanning February through May 2026.
The detection data underpinning this assessment comes from 20 automated honeypot sensors that logged SSH-related violations attributed to 81.30.212.94. The volume of reports combined with the 89% confidence score indicates a consistent, observable pattern of malicious behaviour rather than isolated or anomalous traffic. The fail2ban logs associated with this address recorded at least 56 combined violations across multiple targets, strongly suggesting a sustained, automated password-guessing campaign directed at exposed SSH services. The moderate activity frequency implies persistent rather than burst-based engagement, which is characteristic of credential-stuffing tools scanning broad IP ranges for weak SSH configurations.
SSH brute-force attacks represent a well-established attack vector in which adversaries deploy automated tools to cycle through common username and password combinations against port 22, the default SSH listening port. The real-world risk of such activity is significant because SSH services are frequently internet-facing on both servers and network devices, and weak or default credentials remain prevalent across many deployments. A successful brute-force compromise can grant an attacker persistent remote access, lateral movement capability within a network, and the ability to deploy further payloads, making this threat category one of the most consequential for exposed infrastructure.
Site operators with SSH services accessible from the internet should treat this IP address as a confirmed hostile source. Blocking or rate-limiting traffic from 81.30.212.94 at the network edge is a proportionate defensive response given its threat score. Auditing internet-facing SSH configurations to eliminate unnecessary exposure remains a critical first step. Where feasible, transitioning to key-based authentication eliminates the password-guessing attack surface entirely. Changing the default SSH listening port, disabling root login, and implementing tools such as fail2ban to dynamically block sources exhibiting brute-force patterns provide layered protection against automated credential attacks of this kind.
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